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mutual fund separation theory) receives special treatment. Journal of Economic 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper proves fundamental similarities between two asset pricing 
theories. It compares the mutual fund separation theory (the general case of 
the popular capital asset pricing model) with a new, competitive equilibrium 
version of the well-known arbitrage pricing theory. The paper presents both a 
theoretical and empirical unification of the two theories. First, it derives both 
of the theories simultaneously as two cases of a general theory. Second, the 
paper shows that the testable implications of the two are empirically 
indistinguishable if the analyst only observes asset prices and investors’ 
portfolio returns. 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) receives special treatment as an 
important restricted case of the mutual fund separation theory (MFST). 
Previous authors have remarked that the CAPM provides a convenient 
“black box” which mimics the intuitive understanding of portfolio choice 
and asset pricing in a large, diverse economy. This paper goes a step further: 
it formally constructs a model which follows this intuitive understanding, 
and shows an exact empirical equivalence between this model and the 
CAPM. 
Some of the results of this paper have appeared elsewhere in different 
form. The mutual fund separation theory is due to Ross [ 10). The version 
* This is a revised version of the second chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation, completed under 
the direction of Stephen Ross at the Department of Economics, Yale University. I would like 
to thank Carol Mershon Connor, Philip Dybvig, Jonathan Ingersoll, Alvin Klevorick, Stephen 
Ross, Daniel Siegel, and Ludo van der Heyden for their many helpful comments. 
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described herein simplifies some of the arguments in his proof but sacrifices 
the generality of his result. The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) is also due to 
Ross [8]. This paper derives a competitive equilibrium version of the APT. 
Ross’s arbitrage theory describes the prices of a large, but unspecified, subset 
of the assets. This competitive equilibrium theory describes the prices of all 
the assets in the economy. The competitive equilibrium approach also makes 
it possible to see close relationships between the pricing of assets in a large 
economy and classic principles of market efficiency and portfolio diver- 
sification. 
Section 2 defines a factor economy as an economy in which asset payoffs 
obey a factor model. The theory applies both to a factor economy with a 
finite number of assets and to one with an infinite number of assets. 
Although these two types of economies seem quite different, the general 
theory rarely needs to distinguish between them. The paper uses general- 
dimensional linear algebra to treat both cases simultaneously. 
Section 3 defines market insurance as the ability of market trading to 
completely eliminate idiosyncratic risk from investor portfolios. Section 4 
proves the general pricing theory for any factor economy obeying the market 
insurance conditions. 
Section 5 proves that it is impossible to empirically distinguish the finite 
assets from the infinite assets version of the theory. Section 6 focuses on the 
CAPM as a special case of the finite assets model, and argues that the 
CAPM serves well as an “as if’ model, mimicking the predictions of the 
more intuitive limit theory. Section 7 provides a summary of the paper. 
2. THE DEFINITION OF A FACTOR ECONOMY 
This section gives some basic definitions for an economy in which asset 
payoffs follow a factor model. 
The vector of per-share, gross payoffs for the v risky assets can be written 
as’ 
x=c+Bf+i. (1) 
The K-vector of random variables,f= (f, ,f,,...,f,), consists of the market 
factors. The market factors describe the economy-wide random influences 
which (linearly) affect the payoffs of assets. They are normalized so that 
-wil = 0. 
’ Throughout the paper, upper case Roman letters represent matrices, lower case letters 
represent either vectors or functions, and Greek letters represent scalars. Subscripted terms are 
an exception to this rule: x3 would be a scalar, the third component of the vector x. An 
apostrophe denotes the transpose of a vector or matrix. 
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The beta matrix B is a (v x K)-matrix of constants; the yth row of B is the 
vector of factor betas for the yth asset. Without loss of generality, it can be 
assumed that B has full column rank. Otherwise, there would exist an 
equivalent factor model with fewer factors. (See Appendix 1 of [3] for a 
discussion of equivalent factor models.) 
The nonrandom v-vector c measures the per-share expected payoffs of the 
assets. The paper assumes throughout that there exists a riskless asset with 
per-share payoff x0. 
The vector of idiosyncratic variates, i = (il, i, ,..., i,), represents the extra 
random variation specific to individual assets. These random variates are 
normalized so that E[i,J = 0. The covariance matrix of idiosyncratic terms is 
assumed to exist and is denoted by V: 
V= Elii’]. 
If V is singular, let V-’ denote the Moore-Penrose inverse’ of V. 
The paper assumes that none of the v risky assets is redundant, and 
therefore E[ (x - c)(x - c)’ ] is nonsingular. A portfolio (a,, a) is a linear 
functional on R”+ *. The product of a portfolio with the asset payoffs 
aox + a’x is the portfolio payofJ: A norm is defined on the space of 
portfolios by using the second moment of the portfolio payoffs: 
IJ(a,, a)11 = E[(a,x, + u’X)2]1’2. 
Ross’s arbitrage pricing theory uses a sequential-economy approach. Ross 
considers a sequence of economies with an increasing number of assets and 
proves an approximate pricing result. The approximation increases in 
accuracy as the number of assets grows large. 
Chamberlain and Rothschild [2] have recently shown that many of Ross’s 
results can be succinctly restated by examining a fixed economy with an 
infinite number of assets. This allows the approximating properties of the 
sequential model to become exact properties. This paper adapts the 
Chamberlain-Rothschild technique to a competitive equilibrium version of 
the APT.3 
The paper models an economy with a countably infinite collection of risky 
assets whose payoffs obey a factor model: 
x=c+Bf+i, (2) 
where the terms have the same definitions as in the finite case, replacing 
2 For any finite matrix X there exists a unique matrix X-’ (the Moore-Penrose inverse of 
X) having the properties: XX-IX= X, X-‘XX-’ =X-l, (XX-‘)’ = XX-‘. and (X-IX)’ = 
x- ‘x. 
3 See j4 1 for a sequential-economy model of the equilibrium arbitrage pricing theory. 
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vectors in R” with vectors in R*. Again, I assume that there exists a riskless 
asset with payoff x0. 
For simplicity, the limit model is specified with a finite number of 
investors. Without loss of rigor, one can view each of these investors as 
representing an infinite number of investors of p different types. Within each 
type, all investors are identical. 
As in the finite number case, a portfolio, (a,, a), is a linear functional on 
the space of asset payoffs, R”O. The product of a portfolio with the asset 
payoffs aOxO + a’x is the portfolio pay08 Portfolios are restricted to those 
linear functionals whose payoffs have a finite second moment: 
E[(a,x, + a’x)*] < co. 
This second moment defines the norm on the space: 
Il(u,, a>ll = E[(u,x, + u’x)*]“*. 
This definition of a portfolio means that two collections of asset holdings 
which produce identically the same portfolio payoff constitute the same 
portfolio.4 The definition eliminates spuriously different portfolios. The space 
of portfolios is a Hilbert space. 
An example will illustrate the definition. An investor might choose to hold 
one share of the riskless asset and one-half share of each of the first two 
risky assets. This portfolio could be represented by the array of real 
numbers: (1, i, f, 0, 0, O,...); or the investor might hold 3 share of the first 
three risky assets: (1, i, f, j, 0, 0, O,...). This can be extended to any number 
v of assets: (1, l/v, l/v ,..., l/v, 0, O,...). This model also lets an investor hold 
the limit of such a sequence: 
limit(1, l/v, l/v, l/v ,... ). 
L. - co 
Although such a portfolio cannot be represented by a fixed array of real 
numbers, it is well defined as an element in the vector space of linear 
functionals on R” under the norm (3). 
Define B” as the matrix consisting of the first v rows of B and i” as the 
vector consisting of the first v elements of i. Let v’ =E[i”i”‘]. In the infinite 
assets case it will be assumed that B” has full column rank and v” is 
nonsingular for every v. Note that the sequence must begin at some value of 
v greater than or equal to K. 
4 Using this norm creates equivalence classes containing all linear functionals whose 
difference in payoff has a zero second moment. That is. if (e,, u) and (b,, b) are such that 
E[(a,x, + a’x - box, - b’x)2] = 0 then (a,, a) = (b,, b). 
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The following definitions apply to both the finite and limit factor 
economies. Let (qO, q) be the market portfolio, that is, the per-capita supply 
of assets. 
A vector of asset prices ( pO, p) is a vector of real numbers with dimension 
equal to the number of assets. The cost of a portfolio (a,,, a) is the product 
a0 PO + 0. 
An allocation ((a:, a’), (a:, a’),..., (a:, a’)} is a collection of portfolios, 
one for each investor, which satisfies the resource constraint: 
where ,U is the number of investors. This is just the economy-wide constraint 
and does not include any budget constraint. 
An initial allocation {(e:, e’),..., (e& e“)} is an allocation representing the 
endowments of investors. A competitive equilibrium consists of an 
equilibrium allocation ((a:, a’),..., (a& aQ)) and equilibrium prices (po,p) 
such that 
(budget feasibility) Gpo + aY’p ,< eOypo + eY’p 
and 
(optimality ) E[u~(~$~ + aY’x)] > E[uY( g,x, + g’x)] 
for any portfolio (go, g) which is budget feasible. 
The main assumptions of the theory will be summarized in two definitions. 
A finite factor economy is a set of investors, assets, and endowments such 
that: 
(Fl) There are ,U investors, all of whom have risk-averse, von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. 
(F2) There are v risky assets with per-share payoffs obeying (l), and 
V = E[ii’] and E[fl’] exist. 
(F3) There exists a riskless asset with per-share payoff x0. 
(F4) (B’B) and E[(x - c)(x - c)‘] are nonsingular. 
(F5) E[i If] = 0. 
(F6) The economy has a competitive equilibrium. 
A limit economy is a set of investors, assets, and endowments such that: 
(Ll ) There are ,U investors all of whom have risk-averse von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. 
(L2) There is a countably infinite collection of risky assets obeying 
(2), and v” =E[i”i”] and E[fl’] exist for every v. 
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(L3) There exists a riskless asset with per-share payoff x0. 
(L4) (B”‘BD) and V” are nonsingular for every D. 
(L5) E[i If] = 0. 
Note that in the finite economy the covariance matrix of idiosyncratic 
terms may be singular. If the matrix is nonsingular, it is not possible to 
completely eliminate idiosyncratic risk from portfolios with a finite number 
of assets. In the limit economy, one does not need singularity-investors can 
eliminate idiosyncratic risk by diversifying (i.e., holding many assets, each in 
very small quantity). 
Assumption (F6) can be made exogenous by using Hart’s [ 5 1 results.’ The 
existence of equilibrium in the limit case will follow from its existence in the 
finite case (Theorem 4). 
3. INSURABLE FACTOR ECONOMIES 
This section gives conditions under which all investors in a factor 
economy (finite or limit case) are able to diversify away idiosyncratic risk. It 
also shows, by a Pareto-efficiency argument, that if investors can diversify 
away idiosyncratic risk, they will do so in competitive equilibrium. 
First, the section defines a well-diversified portfolio as one with zero 
idiosyncratic risk. It defines an insured allocation as one in which all 
portfolios are well diversified. An economy is insurable if there exists an 
insured allocation for every distribution across investors of expected payoff 
and market risk. It is‘ shown that if an economy is insurable then the 
competitive equilibrium allocation is insured. 
It is unnecessary to distinguish between the finite and limit cases of the 
theory in this section. The linear algebra is general dimensional, covering 
both cases simultaneously. 
DEFINITION. A well-diversified portfolio (w,, w) is one with no idiosyn- 
cratic risk: E[(w’i)‘] = 0. 
Although the definition is the same in the finite and limit cases, the “diver- 
sification mechanism” behind it differs in the two cases. In the finite assets 
model, investors eliminate risk by exploiting the singularity in the covariance 
matrix of idiosyncratic terms. Investors hold particular combinations of 
assets whose idiosyncratic risks exactly offset one another. In the infinite 
assets model, investors diversify by holding many assets, each in small 
quantity. The infinite number formalism of the model expresses the limit of 
’ If one adds the distributional assumptions that Lfare bounded and that x > 0. then Hart’s 
Theorem 3.3 applies and competitive equilibrium exists. 
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this process: investors hold an infinite number of assets, each in 
infinitesimally small quantity. 
An investor who holds a well-diversified portfolio is effectively insured 
against idiosyncratic risk. If assets are allocated so that all investors hold 
well-diversified portfolios, then all investors are insured. 
DEFINITION. An allocation is insured if it consists entirely of well- 
diversified portfolios. 
The next definition of this section draws an equivalence between portfolios 
which have identical expected payoffs and factor risk but different idiosyn- 
cratic risk. 
DEFINITION. Two portfolios (a,, a) and (w,, w) are factor equivalent if 
a’B = w’B and aOxO + u’c = w,,x,, + w’c. Two allocations, 
{(a;, a’). (u& ~2),..., (a& UN>} and {(w;, WI), (w& w2L.., (w;;, wfi)L 
are factor equivalent if all of their corresponding portfolios are factor 
equivalent: (4, a’) is factor equivalent to (wOy, w3 for y = 1, 2,..., p. 
Economies in which all investors can be assigned well-diversified 
portfolios, for any distribution of expected payoff and factor risk, are called 
insurable. 
DEFINITION. A factor economy is insurable if for any allocation there 
exists a factor-equivalent, insured allocation. 
The next theorem gives the insurability conditions for any factor economy. 
THEOREM 1. A factor economy is insurable ifund only if 
E[ (q’i)~ ] = 0 (4) 
and for any u-vector b there exists a well-diversified portfolio (a,,. a) such 
that 
u’B = b’. (5) 
The Appendix states condition (5) in terms of the primitive elements of the 
factor model. 
Proof (Necessity). Given that an economy is insurable, let {(WA, w,), 
(w& w2),..., (WC, w“)} be any insured allocation. Note that 
O=+ c E[(wy’i)‘]‘/’ >E[(q’i)‘]“‘, 
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where the inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. 
Therefore E[(q’i)*] = 0. 
Let b be any K-vector. Since B has full column rank, for any b there exists 
a portfolio (zO, z) such that z’B = b’. Under the hypothesis of insurability 
there exists a well-diversified portfolio (wO, w) which is factor equivalent to 
(z,, z); hence, 
w’B = z’B = b’, 
which proves that condition (5) is necessary for insurability. 
(Sufficiency). Let ((a:, a’), (a:, a’),..., (a& a”)) be any allocation. 
Replace a’, a’,..., au’-’ with well-diversified, factor-equivalent portfolios 
I 2 w ) w  )...) w’-‘. Let 
u-1 
wp=pq- x wy y= I 
way = $ (u&x, + UY’C - WT’C). 
The allocation {(WA, WI), (wi, w’),..., (w:, w“)} is an insured factor- 
equivalent alternative to {(a;, a’), (a:, a’),..., (a:, a“)}. It is insured because 
I 2 w ) w  ,a.., W n-1 are well diversified by construction, and wW is well diver- 
sified by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality: 
E[(w”‘i)2]“2 <,uE[(q’i)2]“2 + 2 E[(wy’i)‘]“‘. 
y= 1 
It is factor equivalent because w’, w’,..., w@‘-’ are factor equivalent by 
construction and for w“: 
&L--I II-1 
W~rB = pq’B - c wY’B =pq’B - c uY’B = U”‘B. 
y=1 y= I 
The collection of portfolios is an allocation because 
P u-1 e--I 
c wy=pq- z WY+ x wy=pq 
y= 1 y=1 y= I 
and 
u 
c wJ= 2 uoy+L 
y= I y= 1 
xo cuq’c - M’C) = MO * 
Q.E.D 
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Given the assumptions of a factor economy, an investor prefers a well- 
diversified portfolio to a factor-equivalent, undiversified one. 
REMARK 1. In a factor economy, any investor strictly prefers a well- 
diversified portfolio to a factor-equivalent portfolio with nonzero idiosyn- 
cratic variance. 
Proof Let (wO, W) be well diversified and factor equivalent to (a,, a) 
which has nonzero idiosyncratic variance. Using w,,xO + w’c = clOxO + a’c 
and w’B = a’B: 
E[u(a,x, + a’x)] 
= E[u(w,x, + w’c + w’Bf+ a’i)] < E[u(w,x, + w’c + w’Bf)] 
= E[u(w,x, + w’x)], 
where the inequality follows from E[i If] = 0 and Jensen’s inequality. 
Q.E.D. 
The next result is fundamental. It is based on the classic principle that 
competitive markets efficiently allocate risk. Since insured allocations are 
preferable (by Remark 1) and possible (in an insurable economy), the 
Pareto-efficiency of competitive equilibrium guarantees that the competitive 
allocation is insured. 
THEOREM 2. In an insurable factor economy, the competitive allocation 
is insured. 
Proof Let {(a;, a’),..., (a!, all)} be a competitive allocation. Construct 
the factor-equivalent, insured allocation {(w;, w’), (wi, w’),..., (w& wW)) 
described in Theorem 1. By Remark 1, E[u(w,Yx, + wy’x)] >E[(&‘x, + ay’x)], 
where the inequality is an equality if (4, a3 is well diversified. Comparing 
the two allocations gives 
E[u(w;x, + W”X)] 2 E[u(a;x, + d’x)] 
E[u(wix, + W2’X)] > E[u(a;x, + CPX)] 
E[u(w{x,, + w“‘x)] >E[u(a;x, + a“‘~)]. 
Unless all of the inequalities are equalities, the allocation {(WA, w’), 
<w:, w2),..., (w:, w”)} Pareto-dominates {(a&a’), (a&a*),..., (a:,~“)}. There- 
fore, by efficiency, the competitive allocation {(a:, a,), (a:, a*),..., (a;, au)} 
is insured. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2 has as a corollary a mutual fund separation theorem. 
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COROLLARY 2.1. In an insurable factor economy, each investor’s 
equilibrium portfolio consists of a linear combination of K + 1 mutual funds. 
ProoJ By condition (5) there exists a well-diversified portfolio for every 
factor beta position. Construct the K well-diversified portfolios {(a;, a’), 
(4, a’),..., (ai, a”)} with factor beta positions: 
Theorem 2 implies that each investor holds a portfolio which can be 
described as a linear combination of these “mutual fund” portfolios and the 
riskless asset. Q.E.D. 
The standard statement of mutual fund separation is that investors are 
indz@?rent between a mutual fund portfolio and any other portfolio. 
Corollary 2.1 may seem surprisingly strong-they always hold a mutual 
fund portfolio. This is due to the different definition of a portfolio. The usual 
definition distinguishes between portfolios which have the same return (i.e., 
redundant portfolios) whereas the definition used in this paper does not. 
The separation result of the CAPM (Sharpe [ 141) is a special case of 
Corollary 2.1. Corollary 2.1 is less general than Ross’s [ 101 portfolio 
separation theorem for the MFST since Ross describes sufficient and 
necessary conditions. However, this paper’s version has the strength that it 
extends Ross’s small-economy theory to the large-economy case. 
Ross also treats the pricing consequences of his portfolio separation 
theorem. The pricing results in the next section parallel his, but apply to both 
the finite and limit versions of the theory. 
4. PRICE LINEARITY IN AN INSURABLE FACTOR ECONOMY 
This section proves the paper’s pricing thorem. Equilibrium prices in an 
insurable factor economy are linear in the expected payoffs and factor betas 
of the assets. All of the theorems in this section apply to both the finite and 
limit cases. Most of the linear algebra is general dimensional: separate proofs 
for the finite and limit cases are rarely necessary. 
The proof of the pricing theorem relies on the result that investors hold 
well-diversified portfolios. An investor with such a portfolio is risk neutral at 
the margin with respect to idiosyncratic risk. This “marginal risk neutrality” 
means that the investor cannot be in competitive equilibrium unless prices 
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are linear in the factor coefftcients. Otherwise, he can improve his expected 
utility by undiversifying his portfolio. 
DEFINITIONS. Let (pO,p) be the vector of per-share prices of the assets. 
Normalize the prices so that the per-dollar return on the riskless asset equals 
one (x0/p,, = 1). This normalization on prices is retained throughout the 
paper. Prices are linear if a vector m exists such that 
po = .Yg. p=c+Bm. 
The vector m is called the vector offactor prices. 
A portfolio with zero cost, zero risk, and a positive expected payoff is an 
arbitrage portfolio. The next lemma treats a portfolio which is “almost” an 
arbitrage portfolio, except that it contains idiosyncratic risk. 
LEMMA 1. fn any factor economy there exists a portfolio (h,, h) with 
zero cost, zero factor risk, and positive expected payofj 
h,p,+h’p=O, h’B = 0, h,x, + h’c > 0, 
if and only if prices are not linear. 
Proof (Sufficiency). Consider first a finite economy. Suppose that prices 
are not linear. Let m be the vector which minimizes the sum of squares d’d 
in the equation 
p=c+Bm+d. 
By a well-known property of least-squares residuals, the vector d so chosen 
is orthogonal to B. Construct the portfolio 
h, = ; (c’d + d’d), h=-d. 
This portfolio has zero cost, zero factor risk, and an expected payoff of 
h,x, + h’x = c’d + d’d - c’d = d’d 
which is greater than zero whenever d # 0. 
For the limit economy case, construct the v-vector p” which consists of the 
first v elements of p. Similarly, construct the vector cl’ and the (V x K)-matrix 
B”. Let m” be the vector which minimizes the sum of squares d”‘d” in the 
equation 
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If d” =0 for all V, then m’= m* = (B”‘B”))l (p” -c”) for all V. This 
implies that p = c + Bm *. 
Given that d” # 0 for some V, in the limit economy let d* = (d”, 0, 0, O,...) 
and construct the zero cost, zero factor risk portfolio: 
h, =; (d*‘c + d*‘d*), h=-d” 
which has an expected payoff of d”‘d” > 0. 
(Necessity, both finite and limit case). Suppose that prices are linear. Let 
(h,, h) be any hedge portfolio. It has cost: 
h,p, + h’p = h,x, + h’c + h’d. 
Since d = 0, h’d = 0. Hence 
h,p, + h’p = h,x, + h’c > 0 
and the portfolio has positive cost. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1 above shows that if prices are not linear, then there exists some 
“risk premium” for idiosyncratic risk: an investor can costlessly earn 
positive expected profit by incurring idiosyncratic risk. The next theorem 
shows that there cannot exist any such risk premium in an insurable factor 
economy. Therefore, prices must be linear. 
THEOREM 3. In an insurable factor economy, competitive equilibrium 
prices are linear. 
Proo$ Let (a,,, a) be the competitive equilibrium portfolio of some 
investor. By Theorem 2 it is well diversified. Let (h,, h) be any zero cost, 
zero factor risk portfolio. By the optimality of (a,, a) and the zero cost of 
(ho > h): 
$E[u(a,x, + a’x + E(hoxo + h’x>)]c=O = 0, (6) 
otherwise the investor could costlessly increase expected utility by adding an 
increment of (h,, h) to his portfolio. Solving for the derivative (6): 
(h,x, + h’c) E[u’(a,x, + a’x)] + E[ (h’i) u’(a,x, + a’x)]. 
Using E[i ]f] = 0 and a’i E 0 gives 
(h,x, + h’c) E[u’(a,x, + a’x)]. (7) 
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Since (7) = 0 from (6), and E[u’(a,x, + a’x)] > 0 by the risk-aversion 
assumption, this implies 
(h,x, + WC) = 0, 
and this is equivalent to price linearity. Q.E.D. 
The finite economy case in Theorem 3 is the same as Ross’s MFST 
pricing theorem. The limit economy case is a strengthened version of Ross’s 
APT.6 The next section unifies these two theories in another way by showing 
an empirical equivalence. 
5. THE FACTOR PRICING THEORY ISOMORPHISM 
This section shows that an insurable finite economy and an insurable limit 
economy are not empirically distinguishable. Given identity of investor 
preferences and endowments in the two economies, the economies produce 
“isomorphic” competitive equilibria. The equilibrium portfolio return of each 
investor is the same in the two economies, and the linear formula for 
competitive equilibrium prices is the same as well. 
DEFINITION. A finite economy and a limit economy correspond if they 
have the same investor preferences and the same market factors, and their 
endowments are factor equivalent. 
A price vector in a finite economy p and one in a corresponding limit 
economy p* are superficially different, since one belongs to R” and the other 
to R”O. However, if each of the price vectors is linear in the expected payoffs 
and factor betas of its assets: 
p=c+Bm, p*=c*fB*m, 
' Ross's APT guarantees that the sum of squared deviations from price linearity are 
bounded. That is. there exists m, d, w such that p0 = x0, p = c + Bm + d, and d’d < w < co. 
This finite bound on the total sum of squares implies that the mean-squared pricing error goes 
to zero: 
lim (I/v) x dy)’ = 0. 
c-cc y=1 
(8) 
The competitive equilibrium version guarantees that 
d=O. (9) 
See Shanken [ 13 ] for a discussion of the difference in testable implications between (8) and 
(9). 
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and the factor price vector m is the same in each, then the price vectors 
represent identical prices. The “underlying prices” (factor prices) are iden- 
tical. A portfolio in a finite economy and a portfolio in a corresponding limit 
economy are superficially different, since one belongs to the dual space of 
R”+’ and the other to the dual space of Ra. However, if the portfolio 
payoffs are identical, then in an important sense the two portfolios are the 
same. 
DEFINITION. Competitive equilibria of a finite economy and of a 
corresponding limit economy are isomorphic if prices are linear in each 
economy, the factor prices are the same in each, and every investor has the 
same portfolio payoff in the two equilibrium allocations. 
The use of the term “isomorphic” deserves explanation. Note that in either 
economy there is a linear function from an asset’s expected payoff and factor 
betas to its equilibrium price. If the two competitive equilibria are 
isomorphic, then this function is the same in each economy. Similarly, for 
any investor (specified by preferences and an endowment of factor risk and 
expected payoff) there is a function’ to an equilibrium portfolio payoff. If 
two economies are isomorphic then this function is the same. The term 
“isomorphic” denotes the equivalence across these two functions. 
THEOREM 4. Consider an insurable finite economy and a corresponding 
insurable limit economy. For any competitive equilibrium in either economy 
there is an isomorphic one in the other economy. 
Proof: Consider a competitive allocation {(a:, a’),..., (a& aw)} and price 
vector (pO, p) in an insurable finite economy. By Theorem 2, the allocation 
is insured. Construct (see Theorem 1) a factor-equivalent, insured allocation 
in the corresponding limit economy, {(a:‘, a*‘),..., (a,fU, a*“)}. Construct 
the price vector: 
Po=Xo, p* =c* +B*m, 
where m is the factor price vector from the linear prices in the finite 
economy. This allocation and price vector form a competitive equilibrium in 
the limit economy. Competitive equilibrium requires two properties, budget 
feasibility and budget optimality. 
(Budget feasibility). Budget feasibility of the competitive equilibrium in 
the finite economy requires 
egp, + eY’p > a2;po + aYIp. 
‘If there are multiple competitive equilibria then this will be a relation rather than a 
function, but that causes no diffkulty. 
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If two economies have linear prices with the same factor prices, then factor- 
equivalent portfolios in them have the same cost (as the reader can quickly 
prove). By the correspondence of the two economies, each investor’s 
endowments are factor equivalent and e&, + ey’p = e,* ypO + e*yrp*. Hence 
(a,*‘, Use) is budget feasible: 
ezYp, + e*r’p* > a,*Yp, + a*Y’p*, 
(Budget optimality). In an insurable economy with linear prices, an 
investor only needs to consider well-diversified portfolios to find his optimal 
portfolio. For any poorly diversified portfolio, there exists a factor-equivalent 
(and therefore equal cost) portfolio which he will strictly prefer. 
Let (g,, g) be any budget-feasible portfolio in the finite economy. By the 
optimality of competitive portfolios, (a,, a) is weakly preferred to (g,, g). 
Let (go”, g*) be any budget-feasible portfolio in the limit economy. If 
E[u( g,*x, + g*‘x>] > E[u(a$x, + a *‘x)1 then there is a budget-feasible 
(gO,g) in the finite economy such that E[u(g,x, +g’x)] > E[u(a,x, + a’~)], 
contradicting the competitive equilibrium in the finite economy. 
The proof reverses exactly for the mapping from an equilibrium in the 
limit economy to an isomorphic one in the finite economy. Let 
{(a;*,a’*) )..., (a;*,afi* )}, (pt,p*) be an equilibrium in the limit economy. 
By Theorem 3 the prices are linear: p* = c* + B*m. Construct the factor- 
equivalent, insured allocation, {(a;, a’),..., (at, a“)} in the finite economy 
and define p by p = c + Bm, using the factor price vector from the limit 
economy equilibrium. Repeat the proof of feasibility and optimality given 
above. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 4 is my second step in building upon Ross’s evidence that the 
APT and MFST are closely related theories (Ross [ 10, p. 2781). My first 
step is the unified derivation of the MFST and (equilibrium) APT presented 
in Section 4. Theorem 4 provides a more formal connection. It is an 
“impossibility theorem”: one can never distinguish between the finite and 
limit models of this paper, i.e., between the MFST and equilibrium APT, 
based on prices or portfolio returns. This is true even if one fully knows the 
prices which will occur in competitive equilibrium under the two models (see 
Scarf [ 121 for how one might compute the prices). It would be treacherous to 
claim that there is absolutely no testable distinction between the two. The 
theorem only guarantees that portfolio return and asset price observations 
alone will not suffice to distinguish them. 
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6. CHOOSING BETWEEN THE CASES 
Most of this paper has been dedicated to minimizing the distinctions 
between the finite and limit cases of the theory. This section attempts to 
choose which provides a better model of asset pricing based on the 
differences that remain. It argues that the limit case is superior, since it 
requires a weaker assumption on asset supplies. However, the CAPM, a 
restricted version of the finite-assets case, avoids this untenable assumption. 
The most telling comparison of the finite and limit cases centers on the 
assumption that the market portfolio is well diversified: 
E[(q’i)*] = 0. 
As discussed earlier, the “diversification mechanism” behind (4) differs 
between the two cases. In the finite case, asset supplies must be in a 
particular proportion such that the idiosyncratic risks exactly cancel out of 
the market portfolio. This “singularity” assumption is very restrictive on 
asset supplies. It is also nongeneric: a perturbation of asset supplies would 
almost surely destroy this property. 
In the limit case, (4) arises naturally. Asset supplies need not be in any 
special ratio. Rather, the supply of each asset must be “very small” 
(infinitesimal) on a per-capita basis. Together with reasonable bounds on the 
correlations of the idiosyncratic variates this guarantees (4). 
The CAPM does not use the framework of the more general MFST and 
does not require the strong assumption on asset supplies. The CAPM does 
not assume that a factor model generates asset payoffs. Instead, it uses asset 
payoffs to construct a factor model. Given a market portfolio q and asset 
payoffs x consider the market model defined by: 
f = q’x - E[q’x] 
c=E[x] 
B = cov(x, q’x)/var(q’x) 
x=c+Bf+i. 
This is an “ex-post” factor model: asset payoffs determine the factor value, 
rather than the factor value affecting asset payoffs. The CAPM uses this “ex- 
post” factor model to generate the finite-case theory while avoiding its 
untenable restriction on asset supplies. The well-diversified condition on the 
market portfolio follows immediately from the definition of the factor model, 
since q’i = q’x - (var(q’x)/var(q’x)) q’x = 0. If x is joint normal (the usual 
CAPM assumption), then the market model satisfies the other distributional 
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requirement (E[i If] = 0) and price linearity follows by the theorems of 
Section 4. 
The CAPM obviously has been a useful model of asset pricing. Some 
theorists have objected to the model because its derivation is unintuitive. 
This paper provides a formal justification for the simple model. The CAPM 
produces the same empirical predictions as a more sophisticated theory 
which follows the analyst’s intuition. The CAPM provides a convenient 
“black box” which mimics the structure of asset prices and portfolio returns 
in a large, diverse economy. 
7. SUMMARY 
This paper unities the mutual fund separation theory with a new, 
equilibrium version of the arbitrage pricing theory. It considers two 
economies, one with a fixed, finite number of assets and another with an 
infinite number of assets. The mutual fund separation theory is proven on the 
finite assets economy and the equilibrium-version arbitrage pricing theory on 
the infinite assets economy. The paper describes a common framework of 
assumptions for the two economies and proves the two theories 
simultaneously under this framework. 
The paper next proves an empirical equivalence. Given that investor 
preferences and endowments are the same in the two economies, it 
demonstrates that equilibrium prices and portfolio returns are identical in 
them. Hence it is impossible to distinguish between the two theories by 
observing competitive equilibrium prices or portfolio returns. 
Although the capital asset pricing model is mathematically a special case 
of the finite assets model, it requires separate treatment. The CAPM takes a 
different viewpoint from the more general MFST. By doing so, it avoids the 
finite model’s most objectionable assumption. 
Various authors (e.g., Roll and Ross [7]) have argued that the CAPM is 
flawed because it does not capture the intuition which motivates its use. 
Others have countered that the model seems to serve as a convenient “black 
box”-generating predictions similar to those one would expect from a more 
intuitively plausible model. This paper supports the “black box” justification 
of the CAPM with a more rigorous argument. The infinite assets theory 
herein directly follows the large-economy intuition that motivates the 
CAPM. The finite assets theory is empirically identical to this infinite assets 
theory. The CAPM, a restricted version of the finite assets theory, is 
empirically identical to a (restricted version of) the infinite assets theory. 
Hence the CAPM provides a remarkably accurate black box representation 
of the large-economy intuition. 
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APPENDIX 
LEMMA 2. In a finite factor ec&omy, condition (5) holds if and only ij 
(Z - V-’ V) B has fill column rank. 
Proof (Sufficiency). Suppose (I - V- ’ v) B has full column rank. Then 
for any b there exists a solution z to the equation: 
z’(Z- V-IF’) B = 6’. 
For any b the portfolio of risky assets w = (I - V- ’ V) z is well diversified 
and solves the equation: 
w’B = b’; 
hence condition (5) holds. 
(Necessity). Suppose condition (5) holds. Then for any b there exists a w 
such that 
w’B = 6’ and w’V= 0. 
The second condition implies that w’(Z - V-’ V) = MI’; therefore, for any b 
there exists a w such that 
w’(Z- VplV)B==b’ 
which implies that (Z - V- ’ V) B has full column rank. Q.E.D. 
Let /I . lIL denote a matrix norm on RKXK. In general, any norm will do 
since all norms on R KXK generate the same neighborhood of zero. For 
convenience, the proof below uses the Euclidean norm 
LEMMA 3. In a limit factor economy, condition (5) holds if 
hir (I(B”‘(V”)-’ B”)-‘[IK = 0. 
Proof: Suppose that lim,,, IJ(B”‘(V”)-’ B’)-’ IIK = 0. Consider the 
sequence of risky asset portfolios defined by 
wu = (Vu)-1 Bu(BV’(Vu)-I,,)-’ b’ 
w*c = (w”, 0, 0, 0 ,... ). 
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Each portfolio in this sequence has a factor beta vector of b because 
w*uIB = wu”Bu = b’, 
The variances of the portfolios are: 
w*v’vw*” = w”‘Jf”wv = b’(B”‘(V”)-‘B”)-‘b < (b’b) lI(B”‘(~~)-‘B”)-‘II,. 
Given lim,,,, II(B”‘(V”)-’ B”)-1 II6 = 0, this implies lim,,, wD’VVwD = 0. 
The sequence of portfolios (w*“) has constant factor risk and idiosyncratic 
variance approaching zero. Therefore, the sequence converges. Let 
w=lim L’- m w*“. Note that 
w’B = b’ and E[(W’i)2] = 0. Q.E.D. 
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